Analyzing M&A: The Effects of Board Connections by Reale, Harrison
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton Undergraduate Research 
5-2020 
Analyzing M&A: The Effects of Board Connections 
Harrison Reale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars 
 Part of the Business Commons 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/203 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Analyzing M&A: The Effects of Board Connections 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between merger and acquisition outcomes and board 
connectedness as well as cross-sectional variation of intangible measures and deal size metrics. Two 
types of board connections were studied (1) first degree connections where there was a common person 
on the board of both the acquirer and target and (2) second degree connections where an acquirer 
director and a target director were jointly on the board of a common third company. The papers main 
findings are (1) the relationship between acquirer returns around the deal announcement and first degree 
board connections is significantly lower for larger deals, (2) the relationship between target returns and 
first degree connections is significantly lower when the target has higher intangible assets, (3) the 
relationship between a value weighted portfolio and second degree connections is significantly lower 
when the target has higher research and development and significantly higher for larger deals relative to 
acquirers size, and (4) the relationship between takeover premium and second degree connections is 
significantly lower when the target has higher research and development. 
Keywords 
Board Connections, Mergers and Acquisitions, Returns, Takeover Premium 
Disciplines 
Business 
 
 
 
Analyzing M&A: The Effects of Board Connections 
 
By 
 
Harrison Reale 
 
 
  
An Undergraduate Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
WHARTON RESEARCH SCHOLARS  
  
Faculty Advisor: 
Matthew Cedergren 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
  
 
 
 
 THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
MAY 2020 
 
 
 1 
Analyzing M&A: The Effect of Board Connectedness 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between merger and acquisition outcomes and board 
connectedness as well as cross-sectional variation of intangible measures and deal size metrics. 
Two types of board connections were studied (1) first degree connections where there was a 
common person on the board of both the acquirer and target and (2) second degree connections 
where an acquirer director and a target director were jointly on the board of a common third 
company. The papers main findings are (1) the relationship between acquirer returns around the 
deal announcement and first degree board connections is significantly lower for larger deals, (2) 
the relationship between target returns and first degree connections is significantly lower when 
the target has higher intangible assets, (3) the relationship between a value weighted portfolio 
and second degree connections is significantly lower when the target has higher research and 
development and significantly higher for larger deals relative to acquirers size, and (4) the 
relationship between takeover premium and second degree connections is significantly lower 
when the target has higher research and development. 
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1. Introduction 
 This paper analyzes the cross-sectional variation between board connectedness and 
intangible measures as well as deal size metrics in mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with Cai 
and Sevilir (2012), the two types of board connections studied are direct and indirect board 
connections. Direct board connections, also known as interlocked boards or first-degree 
connections, occur when the acquirer and target companies share a common board member. 
Indirect board connections, also known as second degree connections, occur when a board 
member from the acquirer and a board member from the target both serve on the board of a third 
company.  
The papers main findings are (1) the relationship between acquirer returns around the 
deal announcement and first degree board connections is significantly lower for larger deals, (2) 
the relationship between target returns and second degree connections is significantly lower 
when the target has higher intangible assets, (3) the relationship between a value weighted 
portfolio and second degree connections is significantly lower when the target has higher 
research and development and significantly higher for larger deals relative to acquirers size, (4) 
the relationship between takeover premium and second degree connections is significantly lower 
when the target has higher research and development. 
 One theory suggests that direct and indirect board connections can result in reductions in 
information asymmetry surrounding the acquisition, because the connection can facilitate an 
improvement in the acquiring firm's understanding of the target firm's operations and corporate 
culture (Cai and Sevilir). This informational advantage of the acquiring firm of the operations 
and culture can result in an increased understanding of potential synergies, relationships with 
management, faster deals, and creation of value. However, another theory suggests that conflicts 
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of interest may exist with the common director, especially since directors often own stock in both 
companies (Haunschild). The majority of acquisitions result in a premium of the share price of 
the target company, thereby incentivizing the common board member to advocate for the 
acquisition in order to realize this premium. Furthermore, connected boards can expedite the deal 
process at the potential expense of due diligence. These theories suggest perverse incentives 
could destroy value and hurt the deal process. Hence, the impact of interlocking boards is an 
open empirical question.  
This paper will contribute to the literature of interlocking boards and improve our 
understanding of the effect of interlocking boards on mergers and acquisitions by expanding 
upon previous studies to include more recent mergers and acquisitions and conducting cross-
sectional analyses that were previously ignored in prior studies. Though prior studies have 
examined interlocking boards in the context of M&A, there are at least two reasons why it is 
worthwhile to reexamine this topic.  First, much of the literature on interlocked boards includes 
data only through 2008, and it will be informative to analyze the prevalence and influence of 
interlocked boards post financial crisis and whether they differ from previous merger waves. 
Secondly, this study will additionally examine the influence of interlocking boards on M&A 
processes and outcomes cross sectionally, in order to provide insight on the kinds of 
circumstances and situations in which interlocking boards can be especially useful (or 
detrimental) to the M&A process. The cross-sectional analysis intended to be studied are: 
 Firms that have the potential for higher information asymmetry, such as high 
R&D or intangibles 
 Deal Size and Relative Deal Size to determine if common directors have greater 
influence over smaller transactions 
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2. Related Literature 
Several studies have analyzed the effect of interlocked boards on mergers and 
acquisitions. Multiple studies have found that the presence of an interlocked board member 
increases the probability of that target being acquired as compared to potential targets without an 
interlocked board member. Qian and Zhang (2016) analyzed the effect of an interlocking 
directorate on the probability of a target being acquired in China. They found that the probability 
of a potential target being acquired increases when a member of the acquirer’s board is also a 
member on the target’s board of directors. Cukurova (2012) confirmed this finding in U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions, showing that interlocked directors increase the probability of a target 
being acquired by mitigating inefficiencies that arise from information asymmetries in M&A. 
Stuart and Yim (2010) extended these findings, showing that companies that have interlocking 
directors with private equity deal exposure are 42% more likely to receive private equity offers. 
This finding is important, as it shows that interlocking boards play a role not just in strategic 
acquisitions, but private equity acquisitions, as well. All of these articles articulate that 
interlocking boards increase the probability of being acquired, and further research can be done 
on analyzing the quality of these deals. 
The most closely related paper, Cai and Sevilir (2012), analyzed the effect of social 
connections on mergers and acquisitions. They found that acquirers obtain higher announcement 
returns in transactions where board members share first or second degree connections. First 
degree connections, where the acquirer and target share a common director, benefit acquirers 
with lower take over premiums. They attributed the lower takeover premium as a result of the 
information advantage the acquirer has over the target’s operations and corporate culture, fewer 
bidders in the deal process, and communication efficiency resulting in less need for investment 
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bankers. Second degree connections, where one acquirer director and one target director serve on 
the same third board, benefit acquirers with greater value creation. This is the primary study that 
this paper will base its analyses off of and will expand upon its findings by additionally 
analyzing deal quality, total value creatio, cross sectional variation, as well as expanding this 
sample to include mergers and acquisitions from 2009 to today. 
Haunschild (1993) found that board interlocks affect the decision to acquire, takeover 
premium paid, and other corporate governance practices. Zhang (1996) found that the probability 
of a target being acquired is higher than others if it has an interlocking board with the acquirer. 
Mizruchi (1996) analyzes what causes interlocks, their negative implications on decision making 
and profits, and critique interlock research in the 1990s. Ishii and Xuan (2014) argue that cross-
firm social connections between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and target firms 
significantly negatively impact the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity 
upon merger announcement. The implication is that social ties between the acquirer and the 
target lead to poorer decision making and lower value creation for shareholders. Schonlau and 
Singh (2009) found that acquisitions with interlocked boards experience higher buy and hold 
abnormal returns and return on assets. Their focus was on deals between 1991 and 2005. Further 
research can be done on deals post 2007/2008 financial crisis and expand on deal quality.  
Finally, Cai and Sevilir (2012) found that the number of mergers and acquisitions with 
interlocked boards has been decreasing over the time period from 1996 to 2008. They also found 
that interlocked boards commonly occur in the finance, healthcare, and business equipment 
industries. This study will examine whether interlocked boards in a more recent period follow 
this consolidation in the same industries or differ and why. 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
 My M&A list was taken from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum US Mergers 
and Acquisition database. Compustat data was added on for accounting control variables, such as 
Target R&D expenses, Target Intangible Assets, and ROAs. CRSP was used to acquire stock 
price information. To find direct and indirect board connections, the BoardEx database was used. 
However, the BoardEx database only includes data from the S&P top 1500 companies. To fill in 
the gaps, data was added from the Thompson Reuters database. An insider trading board proxy 
was used by looking at directors and if any person had any kind of insider transaction in the 365 
days leading up to the deal announcement, he or she was considered a director at deal 
announcement.  
 
3.2 Variables 
 The independent variables of interest are First Degree Connection, Second Degree 
connection, and then the interactions of these variables with intangible measures and size 
characteristics. The First Degree Connection variable is an indicator variable; it will be 0 when 
the target and acquirer do not have a common director and will be 1 when the target and acquirer 
do have a common director. The Second Degree Connection variable is an indicator variable; it 
will be 1 when the target and acquirer have a board member on a third company's board and it 
will be 0 otherwise. The intangible measures that will interact with first and second degree 
connection variables are Target R&D and Target Intangible Assets. The size measures that will 
interact with the first and second degree connection variables are Relative Deal Size and Deal 
Value. Finally, to eliminate overlap between the first and second degree connection variables, an 
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added constraint is that the degree of connection must be unique. Therefore, first degree 
connection variable is only 1 if there is a first degree connection and no second degree 
connection.  
 The measures of acquisition performance are acquirer abnormal announcement returns 
(ACAR), target abnormal announcement returns (TCAR), portfolio abnormal announcement 
returns (PCAR), and takeover premium (Premium). Other variables and definitions are included 
in the Appendix: Variable Definitions table.  
 
3.3 M&A Selection Set 
 I include in the sample U.S.-based mergers and acquisitions in which both the acquirer 
and target were publicly traded prior to announcement, the deal was completed between 1996 
and 2018, and the deal value was greater than $5 million. While the Cai and Sevilir paper looked 
at transactions between 1996 and 2008, this study includes transactions from 1996 to 2018.  
Rows that contained missing values for the independent variables used in the regressions were 
eliminated. This resulted in a list of 3164 transactions for the ACAR, TCAR, and PCAR 
regressions. The data was further filtered for the Takeover Premium regression to exclude 
missing premiums data, resulting in 2864 transactions.  
 
3.4 Regressions 
 To assess the relationship between interlocking boards and M&A outcomes, I perform 
regressions similar to the approach of Cai and Sevilir, where I control for important factors 
shown to affect M&A outcomes significantly, such as acquirer size, deal size relative to acquirer 
size, financing of the transaction, operating cash flows, leverage, Tobin Qs, ROAs, and other as 
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well as year and industry fixed effects. A series of regressions were performed for four different 
dependent variables, ACAR, TCAR, PCAR, and Premium. 
The first regression will be as follows with the control variables discussed above, 
controlling for both year and industry fixed effects, and includes no interacting terms: 
 
Y = 𝛼 + 𝛽1*First Degree Connection + 𝛽2 * Second Degree Connection + Controls + 𝜀 
 
The second regression will include the same variables as the previous regression but add 
interaction terms between board connectedness and intangible measures. Specifically, four 
interaction terms are added: First Degree Connection * Target R&D, First Degree Connection * 
Target Intangible Assets, Second Degree Connection * Target R&D, Second Degree Connection 
* Target Intangible Assets. Positive and significant coefficients on the interaction variables 
would show that the relationship between the measure of performance (ACAR, TCAR, PCAR, 
or Premiums) and board connectedness (first or second degree) will be higher when the target 
company has higher intangible measures (R&D or intangible assets).  
The third regression will include the same variables as the first regression and add 
interaction terms between board connectedness and size characteristics. Specifically, four 
interaction terms are added: First Degree Connection * Deal Value, First Degree Connection * 
Relative Deal Size, Second Degree Connection * Deal Value, Second Degree Connection * 
Relative Deal Size. Positive and significant coefficients on the interaction variables would show 
that the relationship between the measure of performance (ACAR, TCAR, PCAR, or Premiums) 
and board connectedness (first or second degree) will be higher for larger deals (deal value or 
relative deal size).  
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 depicts the mean summary statistics for the transactions with first-degree 
connections, transactions with second-degree connections, and non-connected transactions. First 
degree connected transactions have the lowest ACAR while second-degree connected 
transactions have the highest ACAR. This is consistent with Cai and Sevilir’s findings where 
direct connections result in inferior deal making and value destruction and indirect connections 
result in better deal making and value creation. Furthermore, TCAR, PCAR, and Premium are 
lower for direct connected transactions, evidence that interlocked boards can acquire targets at 
lower takeover premiums and the deals result in value destruction.  
 The table shows that second-degree connected transactions have the largest average deal 
value, evidence of a relationship between connectedness and deal size. One explanation is that 
larger firms conduct larger deals, and larger firms also have more directors which increases the 
probability of having second-degree connections. Furthermore, the average intangible assets of 
target and research and development in the prior year are highest for first-degree connected 
transactions, evidence that board connectedness and intangible measures may be related. 
 
4.2 Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
Table 2 examines the relationship between acquirer abnormal returns and board 
interlocks, in order to determine whether such interlocks create or destroy for the acquirer. The 
mean ACARs were -1.75%, -0.59%, and -1.02% for first-degree connections, second-degree 
connections, and non-connected connections respectively. These findings are inconsistent with 
the Cai and Sevilir paper (2012), where the mean ACARs for first- and second-degree 
connections were higher than those of non-connected acquisitions. Furthermore, In the first 
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regression, neither first degree connections nor second degree connections were significant at the 
5% level. One explanation is that the merger and acquisition landscape has changed dramatically 
since 2008. When I restricted the data to only include acquisitions made from 1996 to 2008, the 
first-degree connection variable was significant at the 5% level. However, when acquisitions 
from 2009 to 2018 were added to the data, the first-degree connection variable lost its 
significance.  
I hypothesized that the coefficients of the interactions between board connectedness and 
intangible metrics would be positive and significant. Past research has shown that investment 
banking fees have been lower for connected boards (Cai and Sevilir), and premiums have been 
lower due to information advantage (Cai and Sevilir). A higher level of intangible assets adds 
uncertainty about the firm, which gives the connected boards an advantage as they have insight 
into the potential value of the intangibles, such as R&D and book value of intangible assets. I 
expect interlocked boards to have the highest ACAR because the information advantage allows 
for less due diligence and ability to buy the firm at a cheaper price than non-interlocked boards. 
Therefore, I performed a regression with the same variables as the prior regression and added 
four intangible interaction variables: First Degree Connection * Target R&D, First Degree 
Connection * Target Intangible Assets, Second Degree Connection * Target R&D, Second 
Degree Connection * Target Intangible Assets. 
None of the variables of interest were significant in this regression. This could be a result 
of numerous factors. Firstly, the importance of interlocking boards can be decreasing over time. 
Secondly, there are other variables that must be controlled for as well. Cai and Sevilir ran 
regressions that also accounted for if the interlocked board member was an executive at the 
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target, director age, director tenure, board size, GIM index, board independence, board 
connectedness, acquirer stock price run-up, local deal, and director and officer equity ownership. 
My next hypothesis was that the coefficients of the interactions between board 
connectedness and size variables would be positive and significant. Previous research has shown 
that smaller deals relative to acquirer size are related to better acquirer announcement returns 
(Moellar et al., 2004). Connected board members might have greater influence over smaller 
deals. Therefore, I performed a regression and added in four size interaction variables: First 
Degree Connection * Relative Deal Size, First Degree Connection * Deal Value, Second Degree 
Connection * Relative Deal Size, Second Degree Connection * Deal Value. 
The only significant variable of interest in this regression was the interaction variable, 
First Degree Connection * Relative Deal Size, with a negative sign and significant at the 1% 
level. This significance shows that larger deals are related to even lower acquirer cumulative 
abnormal returns if there is an interlocking board. One explanation is that interlocked board 
members have conflicts of interest or biases that cause them to try to acquire a company that they 
are also a board member of. This bias can result in performing mergers and acquisitions that are 
not optimal and destroy value and larger acquisitions, as in higher relative deal sizes, result in 
more value destruction. The market realizes that the merger is not ideal and reduces the share 
price accordingly. 
 
4.3 Target Abnormal Returns 
 Table 3 examines the relationship between target abnormal returns and board interlocks, 
in order to determine whether such interlocks create or destroy value for the target. The mean 
TCARs were 23.6%, 28.6%, 23.6% for first-degree connections, second-degree connections, and 
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non-connected connections respectively. These findings were consistent with Cai and Sevillir, 
where interlocked boards are associated with lower TCARs because of lower takeover 
premiums.  
 The first regression shows that the coefficient on interlocked boards is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. This finding is consistent with Cai and Sevilir, where their 
coefficient on interlocked boards was negative and significant and their coefficient on second 
degree connections was positive and not significant. While this could be evidence that first 
degree connections create information asymmetry, resulting in in lower competing bids and 
lower TCARs, the addition of interacting variables in the next two regressions provide evidence 
that the relationship between TCAR and intangible assets is driven by mergers with connected 
boards.  
 I hypothesize that coefficients of the interactions between board connectedness and 
intangible metrics to be negative and significant. Higher intangibles and R&D levels produce 
uncertainty into the value of the company. Cai and Sivilir find that the number of competing bids 
decreases when an interlocked board member is involved in the transaction. Furthermore, prior 
research has found that takeover premiums and TCARs are lower when there are fewer bids. I 
believe that TCARs will be even lower for transactions where there is a connected board and 
high intangible assets and R&D expenditures.  
 The coefficient of second-degree connections is positive and significant on the 1% level 
and the coefficient of second degree connections * Target Intangible Assets is negative and 
significant on the 1% level. These coefficients show that my hypothesis was partially correct. For 
transactions with second degree connections, the TCAR was lower where the target had high 
levels of intangible assets. This finding is evidence that intangible assets are difficult to value, 
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and acquirers with some insight into the company are able to buy targets at lower premiums. The 
target's R&D expenditures are positive and significant on the 1% level, however neither 
interaction variable between board connectedness and R&D expenditure is significant, showing 
that higher R&D expenditures are associated with higher TCARs, independent from board 
connectedness.  
 A third regression was run on to include interactions between board connectedness and 
size metrics. None of the variables of interest were significant in this regression. One potential 
explanation is the correlation between interlocked boards and deal size characteristics.  
 
4.4 Value Creation 
 Portfolio cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., the weighted average of the target and 
acquiror returns around the announcement) was analyzed to see whether the transaction created 
or destroyed value. Value is created if the PCAR increases. The mean PCARs were 1.78%, 
2.67%, and 1.69% for first-degree connections, second-degree connections, and non-connected 
connections respectively.  
 The first regression in Table 4 shows that the coefficient for second-degree connections is 
positive and significant on the 10% level and the coefficient for interlocked boards is negative 
but not significant. This is consistent with Cai and Sivilir findings where interlocked boards are 
associated with value destruction and second-degree connections are associated with value 
creation. 
 My first hypothesis was that PCARs for connected boards will be higher for transactions 
where the target has high intangible metrics due to information asymmetry and a greater ability 
to create synergies due to a greater understanding of the company. The regression shows that the 
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only variable of interest with a significant coefficient is the interaction variable, Second Degree 
Connection * Target R&D. The coefficient is negative, indicating that transactions with indirect 
connections lower PCARs more when targets have higher R&D levels. One explanation is that 
acquirers indirect connections overestimate their understanding of the target company, especially 
for targets with high R&D expenditures. This results in worse deal making for harder to 
understand high R&D targets, and better for easier to understand low R&D targets.  
 A third regression was run to analyze the interaction variables between board 
connectedness and size characteristics. The only variable of interest that was significant was the 
positive coefficient on second degree connection * relative deal size. This shows that 
transactions with indirect connections result in higher PCARs when the relative deal size is large. 
One explanation is that indirect connections result in information asymmetry and a better ability 
to source high quality deals. Furthermore, larger transactions allow for the potential for greater 
synergies between the target and acquirer. Interactions with first degree connections are not 
significant in this regression. 
 
4.5 Takeover Premiums 
 Table 5 examines the relationship between takeover premiums and board interlocks, to 
determine whether such interlocks influence whether acquirers with connected boards could buy 
the target at a lower premium. The mean takeover premiums were 39.05%, 41.35%, and 44.01% 
for first-degree connections, second-degree connections, and non-connected connections 
respectively. These findings are consistent with Cai and Sevilir, where interlocked boards are 
associated with lower takeover premiums because of informational advantages of connected 
boards and fewer bidders. 
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 The first regression is consistent with Cai and Sevilir’s paper, in that the coefficient on 
interlocked boards is negative and significant, and the second-degree connections had no 
significance. They explained that first-degree connections have the lowest premium because of 
the information advantage about the true value of the target. The second-degree connections also 
have an information advantage, but not to the extent of first-degree connections, thus explaining 
their lower takeover premiums to non-connected transactions.    
 My hypothesis is targets with high intangibles and research and development have the 
potential for even greater information advantage. Therefore, connected boards will be able to 
acquire targets at lower takeover premiums because of the much higher information advantage. 
Table 5 shows that many of the board connectedness variables and interaction variables are 
negative in the regression on takeover premiums. This is consistent with my hypothesis, however 
the only variable of interest that is highly statistically significant is the interacting variable 
between second-degree connections and target R&D in year prior. I found that the coefficient on 
Second Degree Connection * Target R&D is negative and significant at the 1% level. One 
explanation for why this variable is negative is that the value that R&D creates is difficult to 
measure and difficult to predict. Therefore, acquirers that have the potential for understanding 
the value created by R&D (i.e., first- and second-degree connections) have an information 
advantage of the true value of the company, which decreases due diligence and investment 
banking fees, aids in negotiations with target company, and scares away other bidders. 
 A third regression was run to analyze the interaction variables between board 
connectedness and size characteristics. None of the variables of interest were significant in this 
regression. This provides evidence that information asymmetry as the result of connected boards 
does not vary with relative deal size or deal value. 
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5. Conclusion 
 This paper examines mergers and acquisitions from 1996 to 2018 and provides evidence 
that board connection varies cross sectionally with intangible measures and size characteristics, 
creating important implications for investing decisions and value creation. The coefficients found 
to be significant were (1) the negative coefficient on the interaction between first degree 
connections and relative deal size on ACAR, (2) the negative coefficient on the interaction 
between second degree connections and target intangible assets for TCAR, (3) the positive 
coefficient on the interaction between second degree connection and relative deal size for PCAR, 
(4) the negative coefficient on second degree connection and target research and development for 
PCAR, and (5) the negative coefficient on second degree connection and target research and 
development for takeover premium.  
 Future research on cross sectional variation between board connectedness and acquirer, 
target, or deal characteristics would help expand the literature on the impact of first and second 
degree connections on mergers and acquisitions. One potential research topic is to explore the 
cross sectional variation between connected boards and board size to determine if connected 
boards have a real effect on M&A or the effect is just the result of large board of directors. Other 
potential research topics include how the effect board connectedness on mergers and acquisitions 
is changing over time or varies across countries.  
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7. Appendix 
Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions Data Source 
Measures of acquisition performance  
ACAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for acquirer using 3 
day short return window (-1, +1) around deal announcement. 
CRSP 
TCAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for target using 3 day 
short return window (-1, +1) around deal announcement. 
CRSP 
PCAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for a value-weighted 
portfolio of acquirer and target using market values of equity 
during a 3 day short return window (-1, +1) around deal 
announcement. 
CRSP 
Premiums Premium of offer price to target share price 4 weeks prior to 
deal announcement 
SDC 
   
Firm and Deal Characteristics  
AFirmSize Natural log of market value of acquirer 4 weeks prior to deal 
announcement 
CRSP 
ATobinQ Market value of acquirer's assets divided by book value of 
assets 
Compustat 
TtobinQ Market value of target’s assets divided by book value of 
assets  
Compustat 
Alev Book value of acquirer's debt divided by book value of assets Compustat 
Tlev Book value of target's debt divided by book value of assets Compustat 
AROA Acquirers return on assets in fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement 
Compustat 
TROA Target's return on assets in fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement 
Compustat 
RelativeDealSize Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity SDC/CRSP 
Tender_Offer Indicator variable: 1 if tender offer and 0 if not a tender offer SDC 
Toehold Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer had a toehold in target and 0 
otherwise 
SDC 
Hostile Indicator variable: 1 if deal was hostile and 0 otherwise SDC 
AOCF Acquirers operating cash flow in fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement 
Compustat 
TOCF Targets operating cash flow in fiscal year prior to deal 
announcement 
Compustat 
diversifying Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target had different 2 digit 
SIC codes and 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Stock_deal Indicator variable: 1 if stock was used to finance deal and 0 
otherwise 
SDC 
TXrdRevt Target R&D (scaled by total revenue) in last fiscal year 
ending before deal announcement 
Compustat 
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TIntanAT Target intangible assets (scaled by total assets) in last fiscal 
year before deal announcement 
Compustat 
VAL Deal acquisition value ($ millions) SDC 
   
Board Connection Variables  
First Degree 
Connection 
An indicator variable for whether there was a common person 
on the board of  
both the acquiror and the target  
BoardEx/ 
Thompson 
Reuters 
Second Degree 
Connection 
An indicator for whether an acquirer director and a target 
director were jointly  
on the board of a common third company  
BoardEx/ 
Thompson 
Reuters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Data Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 This data table depicts the mean summary statistics for all completed public U.S.-based 
deals between 1996 and 2018 after filtering for missing values.  
 
Full Sample
First-degree 
connected
transactions
Second-
degree
connected
transactions
Non-
connected
transactions
No. of Observations 3164 127 255 2782
VAL 2065.28 1757.09 4310.30 1839.86
ACAR -1.02 -1.91 -0.81 -0.99
TCAR 24.02 24.71 30.39 23.29
PCAR 1.93 1.73 2.68 1.86
Premium 43.35 39.12 42.07 43.71
AFirmSize 14.86 15.11 15.65 14.76
ATobinQ 1.92 1.53 1.48 1.99
TTobinQ 1.57 1.71 1.57 1.56
ALev 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19
TLev 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.18
AROA 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
TROA 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00
RelativeDealSize 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tender_Offer 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.20
Toehold 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08
Hostile 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
AOCF 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08
TOCF 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
diversifying 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.65
Stock_deal 0.56 0.39 0.58 0.57
TXrdRevt 0.35 1.50 1.00 0.22
TIntanAt 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.11  
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Table 2 
Determinants of Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
 This table depicts the output of an ordinary least squares regression for ACAR. ACAR is 
calculated as the abnormal return of the acquirer from 1 day before deal announcement to 1 day 
after deal announcement (-1, +1). Column (1) is a regression with no interaction variables. 
Column (2) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and intangible 
measures. Column (3) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and deal 
size characteristics. All regressions controlled for industry and year and had 3164 observations. 
    ACAR   
  (1) (2) (3) 
First Degree Connection -1.032 -1.154 1.037 
 
(0.747) (0.984) (0.977) 
Second Degree Connection 0.521 0.688 0.571 
 
(0.540) (0.661) (0.636) 
First Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
0.041 
 
  
(0.088) 
 First Degree Connection x Target Intangible 
Assets 
 
0.290 
 
  
(3.810) 
 
Second Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-0.121 
 
  
(0.096) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target Intangible Assets 0.290 
 
  
(3.810) 
 
First Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
-4,354*** 
   
(1332.039) 
First Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
Second Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
-418.079 
   
(792.704) 
Second Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
AFirmSize -0.181* -0.185** -0.192** 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
ATobinQ -0.060 -0.057 -0.059 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
TTobinQ 0.032 0.032 0.029 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
ALev 1.039 1.004 0.976 
 
(0.947) (0.948) (0.946) 
TLev 0.053 0.077 0.053 
 
(0.747) (0.747) (0.747) 
AROA -1.556 -1.482 -1.772 
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(1.935) (1.936) (1.934) 
TROA -1.210 -1.187 -1.195 
 
(1.307) (1.309) (1.306) 
RelativeDealSize -567.221* 
-
575.267** -369.467 
 
(290.977) (291.301) (310.319) 
Tender_OfferTRUE 0.130 0.110 0.078 
 
(0.447) (0.448) (0.447) 
ToeholdTRUE 0.655 0.681 0.650 
 
(0.597) (0.598) (0.596) 
HostileTRUE -1.369 -1.397 -1.508 
 
(1.770) (1.770) (1.776) 
AOCF 3.586 3.389 3.928* 
 
(2.322) (2.325) (2.323) 
TOCF -0.223 -0.200 -0.230 
 
(1.508) (1.509) (1.506) 
diversifyingTRUE -0.099 -0.098 -0.137 
 
(0.332) (0.333) (0.332) 
Stock_dealTRUE -2.992*** -3.007*** -2.976*** 
 
(0.369) (0.369) (0.368) 
TXrdRevt -0.055* -0.040 -0.058* 
 
(0.033) (0.077) (0.033) 
TIntanAt 1.501 1.467 1.423 
 
(0.986) (1.049) (0.985) 
VAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Intercept) 5.177*** 5.252*** 5.245*** 
 
(1.694) (1.695) (1.695) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3164 3164 3164 
Adj. R^2 0.0553 0.0555 0.0580 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns (TCAR) 
 This table depicts the output of an ordinary least squares regression for TCAR. TCAR is 
calculated as the abnormal return of the target from 1 day before deal announcement to 1 day 
after deal announcement (-1, +1). Column (1) is a regression with no interaction variables. 
Column (2) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and intangible 
measures. Column (3) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and deal 
size characteristics. All regressions controlled for industry and year and had 3164 observations. 
    TCAR   
  (1) (2) (3) 
First Degree Connection -5.107* -1.682 -4.941 
 
(3.001) (3.938) (3.932) 
Second Degree Connection 2.555 7.607*** 2.647 
 
(2.166) (2.640) (2.557) 
First Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
0.379 
 
  
(0.354) 
 First Degree Connection x Target Intangible Assets 
 
-25.101 
 
  
(15.247) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-0.755 
 
  
(0.385) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target Intangible 
Assets 
 
-
25.101*** 
 
  
(15.247) 
 First Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
-482.485 
   
(5360.514) 
First Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.001) 
Second Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
328.809 
   
(3190.206) 
Second Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
AFirmSize 0.150 0.113*** 0.145 
 
(0.378) (0.378) (0.380) 
ATobinQ 0.336** 0.365** 0.335* 
 
(0.166) (0.166) (0.167) 
TTobinQ -1.199*** -1.209*** -1.197*** 
 
(0.276) (0.275) (0.276) 
ALev -2.443 -2.330 -2.439 
 
(3.804) (3.798) (3.811) 
TLev 0.524 0.816 0.549 
 
(2.999) (2.990) (3.006) 
AROA 0.884 1.361 0.856 
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(7.773) (7.749) (7.785) 
TROA -8.195 -7.788 -8.185 
 
(5.251) (5.239) (5.256) 
RelativeDealSize 
-
4176.2*** 
-
4311.6*** 
-
4201.3*** 
 
(1169.007) (1166.361) (1249.416) 
Tender_OfferTRUE 9.399*** 9.370*** 9.386*** 
 
(1.798) (1.792) (1.801) 
ToeholdTRUE 
-
10.892*** 
-
11.020*** 
-
10.903*** 
 
(2.398) (2.393) (2.400) 
HostileTRUE 2.375 2.246 2.557 
 
(7.106) (7.082) (7.146) 
AOCF 2.845 1.373 2.851 
 
(9.330) (9.307) (9.352) 
TOCF 1.296 1.362 1.301 
 
(6.062) (6.044) (6.067) 
diversifyingTRUE 0.844 0.894 0.857 
 
(1.336) (1.331) (1.338) 
Stock_dealTRUE -5.576*** -5.879*** -5.582*** 
 
(1.483) (1.480) (1.485) 
TXrdRevt 0.698*** 0.702** 0.697*** 
 
(0.133) (0.307) (0.134) 
TIntanAt 5.139 9.309 5.134 
 
(3.960) (4.199) (3.965) 
VAL 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Intercept) 16.064** 16.297** 16.149** 
 
(6.807) (6.789) (6.827) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3164 3164 3164 
Adj. R^2 0.1020 0.1083 0.1007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
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Determinants of Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (PCAR) 
 This table depicts the output of an ordinary least squares regression for PCAR. PCAR is 
calculated as the abnormal return of a value weighted portfolio of the target and acquirer from 1 
day before deal announcement to 1 day after deal announcement (-1, +1). Column (1) is a 
regression with no interaction variables. Column (2) is a regression with interactions between 
board connectedness and intangible measures. Column (3) is a regression with interactions 
between board connectedness and deal size characteristics. All regressions controlled for 
industry and year and had 3164 observations. 
    Premium   
  (1) (2) (3) 
First Degree Connection -9.704* -7.010 -15.452 
 
(6.182) (8.200) (8.048) 
Second Degree Connection 0.410 6.115 1.785 
 
(4.575) (5.591) (5.458) 
First Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-0.881 
 
  
(0.744) 
 First Degree Connection x Target Intangible Assets 
 
-17.584 
 
  
(31.115) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-2.227*** 
 
  
(0.826) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target Intangible 
Assets 
 
-17.584 
 
  
(31.115) 
 First Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
8861.917 
   
(10893.85) 
First Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.001 
   
(0.002) 
Second Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
-3968.171 
   
(6469.800) 
Second Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
AFirmSize -1.095 -1.151 -1.079 
 
(0.816) (0.816) (0.819) 
ATobinQ 0.966*** 0.987*** 0.978*** 
 
(0.376) (0.376) (0.377) 
TTobinQ -1.991*** -2.038*** -1.998*** 
 
(0.648) (0.647) (0.648) 
ALev 13.099* 13.538* 13.461* 
 
(8.058) (8.067) (8.069) 
TLev -9.233 -8.526 -9.509 
 
(6.327) (6.325) (6.338) 
AROA 24.786 24.735 25.164 
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(17.312) (17.297) (17.330) 
TROA -0.242 1.304 -0.182 
 
(11.382) (11.390) (11.389) 
RelativeDealSize -2135.693 -2477.967 -1938.610 
 
(2386.437) (2387.123) (2546.877) 
Tender_OfferTRUE 4.939 4.934 4.998 
 
(3.735) (3.732) (3.739) 
ToeholdTRUE -8.897** -9.217** -8.746** 
 
(5.063) (5.065) (5.067) 
HostileTRUE 12.403 12.189 12.232 
 
(14.277) (14.263) (14.354) 
AOCF -9.882 -11.387 -9.994 
 
(20.610) (20.612) (20.647) 
TOCF -24.992* -24.205* -25.189* 
 
(13.043) (13.037) (13.051) 
diversifyingTRUE -1.363 -1.195 -1.381 
 
(2.824) (2.823) (2.830) 
Stock_dealTRUE -4.919 -5.301 -5.006 
 
(3.166) (3.167) (3.169) 
TXrdRevt 1.445*** 2.535*** 1.448*** 
 
(0.276) (0.654) (0.277) 
TIntanAt 5.231 9.094 5.260 
 
(8.322) (8.870) (8.330) 
VAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Intercept) 58.890*** 59.260*** 58.446*** 
 
(14.517) (14.513) (14.558) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2864 2864 2864 
Adj. R^2 0.0500 0.0521 0.0491 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
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Determinants of Takeover Premiums 
 This table depicts the output of an ordinary least squares regression for takeover 
premiums. Takeover Premium is calculated as the offer price premium to the target’s stock price 
4 weeks prior to announcement date. Column (1) is a regression with no interaction variables. 
Column (2) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and intangible 
measures. Column (3) is a regression with interactions between board connectedness and deal 
size characteristics. All regressions controlled for industry and year and had 2864 observations. 
    PCAR   
  (1) (2) (3) 
First Degree Connection -0.885* -0.487 0.037 
 
(0.717) (0.943) (0.937) 
Second Degree Connection 0.860 0.923 0.358 
 
(0.518) (0.633) (0.610) 
First Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-0.063 
 
  
(0.085) 
 First Degree Connection x Target Intangible Assets 
 
-2.405 
 
  
(3.653) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target R&D 
 
-0.177* 
 
  
(0.092) 
 Second Degree Connection x Target Intangible 
Assets 
 
-2.405 
 
  
(3.653) 
 First Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
-1798.67 
   
(1278.06) 
First Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
Second Degree Connection x Relative Deal Size 
  
1715.780** 
   
(760.624) 
Second Degree Connection x Deal Value 
  
0.000 
   
(0.000) 
AFirmSize -0.613*** -0.615*** -0.621*** 
 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.091) 
ATobinQ -0.001 0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
TTobinQ -0.046 -0.048 -0.044 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
ALev 0.444 0.418 0.351 
 
(0.908) (0.910) (0.909) 
TLev -0.450 -0.412 -0.349 
 
(0.716) (0.716) (0.717) 
AROA -0.330 -0.232 -0.426 
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(1.856) (1.856) (1.856) 
TROA 0.513 0.555 0.493 
 
(1.254) (1.255) (1.253) 
RelativeDealSize 1813.08*** 1792.90*** 1664.70*** 
 
(279.131) (279.433) (297.895) 
Tender_OfferTRUE 0.507* 0.491* 0.489* 
 
(0.429) (0.429) (0.429) 
ToeholdTRUE 0.547 0.551 0.526 
 
(0.573) (0.573) (0.572) 
HostileTRUE 2.811 2.811 2.948* 
 
(1.697) (1.697) (1.704) 
AOCF 3.901* 3.718* 3.921 
 
(2.228) (2.230) (2.230) 
TOCF -0.195 -0.107 -0.141 
 
(1.447) (1.448) (1.447) 
diversifyingTRUE 0.126 0.138 0.142 
 
(0.319) (0.319) (0.319) 
Stock_dealTRUE -2.439*** -2.458*** -2.437*** 
 
(0.354) (0.355) (0.354) 
TXrdRevt -0.020 0.066 -0.021 
 
(0.032) (0.074) (0.032) 
TIntanAt 1.461 1.535 1.454 
 
(0.946) (1.006) (0.945) 
VAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Intercept) 10.854*** 10.863*** 11.084*** 
 
(1.625) (1.627) (1.628) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3164 3164 3164 
Adj. R^2 0.0890 0.0893 0.0903 
 
